A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule and (ii) whose solution with additional integer constraints corresponds to the optimal static rule. We present a condition-foresight-under which the optimal persuasion problem reduces to the classical maximum flow problem. This has various qualitative consequences, including the coincidence of optimal dynamic and static persuasion rules, elimination of the need for randomization, and symmetry of optimal static rules.
Introduction
This paper compares two modes of persuasion: static persuasion and dynamic persuasion.
In both scenarios, a speaker presents evidence to a listener in order to persuade the listener to take the speaker's preferred action. Static persuasion is one-shot: the speaker simply presents evidence and the listener responds with a decision. Dynamic persuasion involves back-and-forth communication. The speaker makes an opening argument via a cheap talk claim. The listener then requests some of the evidence which the speaker claims to have.
The speaker responds by either presenting the requested evidence or some other evidence.
Finally, the listener makes his decision. Through the comparison of static and dynamic persuasion, we aim to attain an enriched understanding of (i) the determination of what evidence will be persuasive, and of (ii) when and how dynamic back-and-forth cheap talk communication complements evidence production in strategic persuasion.
Dynamic persuasion may outperform static persuasion when it is infeasible for the speaker to present all evidence due to costs associated with presenting or processing evidence. Then the opening argument guides the subsequent back-and-forth discussion. For example, in a time-constrained interview, a job candidate must strategically decide which qualifications to emphasize. If she emphasizes her leadership capacity, the employer may ask her how she would lead certain projects, and to provide evidence of her past leadership.
If she emphasizes her analytical ability, the employer may give her a puzzle to solve. The job seeker may be afraid to make false claims for fear of being asked for supporting evidence that she cannot supply. It will often benefit the listener to randomize her response to the speaker's claims, because if the speaker can predict what follow-up questions will be asked, she may lie about everything else.
The paper provides a unified framework for thinking about both static and dynamic persuasion, and the relationship between the two. We focus on mechanisms-called persuasion rules-which are optimal for the listener. Our main contributions are:
1. We characterize the relation between optimal dynamic and static persuasion by presenting a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the optimal dynamic persuasion rule and (ii) whose solution with additional integer constraints corresponds to the optimal static persuasion rule.
2. We present a condition with a natural interpretation-which we call foresight-under which our linear program simplifies to the classical maximum flow problem. This leads to various qualitative consequences, including the coincidence of optimal dynamic and static persuasion rules, elimination of the need for randomization, and symmetry of optimal static rules.
The remainder of the introduction elaborates on these two contributions. We discuss the two results in turn.
Characterization of Optimal Persuasion
Our first main contribution is the exact simultaneous characterization of optimal static and dynamic persuasion: Theorem 1 presents a linear programming characterization of optimal dynamic persuasion, and Theorem 2 shows that by adding an integer constraint, one obtains an integer programming characterization of optimal static persuasion. This result serves as a foundation for all of our other results, including the credibility result to be described below, and the stronger characterization under the additional foresight assumption to be described in Section 1.2. Being an exact characterization, these programs should serve as the starting point for future studies of the persuasion problem or variants thereof.
Our characterization has an intuitive interpretation: it provides a precise sense in which static persuasion equals dynamic persuasion minus randomization. While static rules allow for randomization of the listener's decision, randomization is only beneficial as part of a back-and-forth conversation. 1 Conversely, such back-and-forth communication can be useful only if the listener's questions are unpredictable. If a question is predictable, it need not be asked; the speaker will know at the outset that she must answer it. So a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic communication to improve on static communication is that the listener can benefit by randomizing his questions. Rubinstein (2004, 2006) initiated the study of optimal persuasion rules. 2 Our results shed interesting light on the main results of Glazer and Rubinstein. Glazer and Rubinstein used a constraint called the L-principle to analyze persuasion. We characterize the circumstances in which the L-principle captures all of the incentive constraints involved in optimal persuasion, and show that the L-principle is not in general sufficient for analyzing optimal dynamic persuasion. Our more general analysis then allows us to extend an important result of Glazer and Rubinstein to a broader class of persuasion problems.
In particular, the optimal persuasion problem assumes listener commitment, but we show that in the dynamic persuasion problem, commitment has no value for the listener. In other words, there is a sequential equilibrium of the dynamic persuasion game in which the listener cannot commit to his strategy up front and which implements the same outcome as the optimal rule. This credibility result generalizes a result of Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) beyond the case to which the L-principle applies. The dual of the program in our result characterizing optimal dynamic persuasion-Theorem 1-is used to derive the speaker's strategy in the credible implementation of the optimal rule.
Foresight and Max Flow
Our second main contribution is a reduction of the optimal persuasion problem to the classical maximum flow problem (Max Flow) under an intuitive and easily verifiable condition which we call foresight (Theorem 6). Max Flow is a very extensively studied optimization problem from the field of combinatorial optimization (see, for example, Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin (1993) ). Our reduction allows us to provide a condition under which optimal static and dynamic rules coincide, randomization is not needed for optimal persuasion, and optimal static rules are symmetric, in the sense that similar evidence is treated similarly.
The reduction also generates monotone comparative statics for persuasion, which can be found in an earlier version of this paper (Sher 2008) . A fundamental theorem on the maximum flow problem is the max-flow min-cut theorem (Ford and Fulkerson 1956) , which is a special case of linear programming duality. In Section 5.2, we illustrate how the credibility result mentioned above (in Section 1.1) coincides with max-flow min-cut duality under foresight.
Foresight has a natural interpretation. The optimal persuasion problem contains two types of states: accept states and reject states. The listener would like to be persuaded by the speaker only in accept states. Define evidence to be genuine whenever it is presented in an accept state and forged whenever it is presented in a reject state. Foresight means that at every accept state x there is evidence m x which is maximally difficult to forge (among evidence available at x) in the sense that m x is available least often in reject states (measured by inclusion). We call the property "foresight" because in the dynamic communication protocol, the speaker should be able to foresee that if she claims the state is x (an accept state), the listener would require evidence m x as support (if the claim x has any chance of being persuasive). This contrasts with the general case in which the speaker faces a lottery over evidence requests.
In the context of the persuasion environment studied here, foresight generalizes the concept of normality from the literature on mechanism design with evidence (Bull and Watson 2007) . Closely related properties were studied by Green and Laffont (1986) and Lipman and Seppi (1995) . Remark 1 and the discussion following Corollary 1 in Section 5 highlight the ways in which foresight is weaker than normality. In the conclusion (Section 7), we explain how the basic idea underlying foresight can be extended to more general mechanism design problems with evidence.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the linear programming formulation of optimal persuasion. Section 4 uses this formulation to attain a new credibility result. Section 5 studies the consequences of foresight.
Section 6 briefly provides some consequences of the preceding analysis for the complexity of optimal rules. Section 7 concludes.
Model
Section 2.1 presents the persuasion environment. Section 2.2 presents two modes of persuasion: static and dynamic persuasion. The model of static persuasion is the model of Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) and the model of dynamic persuasion generalizes Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) . Section 2.3 establishes the robustness of the model of dynamic persuasion.
Environment
Let X be a finite set of states. A ⊆ X is the set of accept states and R = X \ A is the set of reject states. For x ∈ X, p x > 0 is the probability of x. Let p = (p x ) x∈X .
A speaker would like to persuade a listener to accept a request. For example, the speaker may be attempting to persuade the listener to hire her. Alternatively, the speaker may be a lobbyist attempting to persuade the listener, a legislator, to support some legislation. The speaker would always like to be accepted regardless of the state. Ideally, the listener would like to accept the speaker when the state is in A and reject the speaker when the state is in R. If the listener is uncertain about the state, he would like to minimize the error probability, that is, the probability that he accepts in R or rejects in A.
For every state x ∈ X, there is a finite nonempty set σ(x) of statements which are available at x. σ is the message correspondence. Let M = x∈X σ(x). There exists m 0 ∈ M such that for all x ∈ X, m 0 ∈ σ(x). m 0 is called the vacuous message because it proves nothing about the state. m 0 simplifies proofs but is inessential to our results. We generally omit m 0 in examples.
The message correspondence models a communication constraint. As different messages are available at different states, the messages amount to evidence. Imagine, for example, that an unqualified person interviews for a computer programmer position. The interviewer asks how the interviewee would program a certain task. The interviewee-being unqualifiedis unable to answer. Were she qualified, she would be able to answer.
An important aspect of the constraint encoded by σ is that the speaker may only present one message m ∈ σ(x). This may be a time constraint. To see that this is essentially without loss of generality, define:
If we wanted to relax the time constraint, and let the speaker present n messages instead of just one, we could simply replace σ by the message correspondence σ n .
Two Modes of Persuasion
We introduce static persuasion and dynamic persuasion. The static timing is:
4. The speaker presents some message m ∈ σ(x).
(a)
If the speaker fails to present the requested message (i.e., m = m), the listener rejects the speaker's request.
(b) If the speaker presents the requested message (i.e., m = m), the listener accepts the speaker's request.
A listener's strategy specifies the probability that he requests various messages (Step 3a), and that he rejects the speaker's request outright (Step 3b). (The listener's behavior is fixed at Step 5). Formally, the listener's strategy is a function g :
(3) says that the listener never requests a message the speaker claims is unavailable. (2) allows us to interpret g(x, m) as a probability. A function g satisfying (2-3) is a dynamic persuasion rule. G is the set of such dynamic rules.
For both protocols, we assume the listener commits to a persuasion rule and the speaker best replies. (We will relax this commitment assumption in Section 4). Any persuasion rule then induces an acceptance probability at every state. For a static persuasion rule f , the acceptance probability is α(f, x) := max m∈σ(x) f (m) because the speaker will simply select the available message which maximizes the acceptance probability. For a dynamic persuasion rule g, the acceptance probability is:
To understand this, observe that if the speaker claims the state is z when the state is really x, the listener will only request messages m belonging to σ(z), and the speaker will only succeed in presenting the required messages if they belong to σ(x) as well. At state x, the speaker will choose the cheap talk report z which maximizes the probability of acceptance.
Given a persuasion rule h (static or dynamic), the induced error probability at state x is then given by µ x (h) := 1 − α(h, x) if x ∈ A, and µ x (h) := α(h, x) if x ∈ R. The total error probability is then µ(h) := x∈X p x µ x (h). The static persuasion problem is to select f ∈ F to minimize µ(f ) and the dynamic persuasion problem is to select g ∈ G to minimize µ(g). Nothing essential would change if we introduce a state dependent error cost x > 0. Then the listener would minimize x∈X x p x µ x (h). One could derive analogs of all our results by substituting x p x for p x .
The Dynamic Protocol is Canonical
We now establish that nothing would be gained by considering mechanisms more general than the dynamic communication protocol. Consider an arbitrary finite two-player extensive form game with imperfect information and perfect recall Γ. (See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for precise definitions). The two players are the speaker and listener. Γ has no moves of nature, although allowing moves of nature would not alter Proposition 1. 3 Every terminal history is labeled either accept or reject. There are two types of histories among those at which the speaker moves: evidentiary and ordinary histories. At evidentiary histories the set of available actions is M ; no restrictions are placed on ordinary histories.
Define Γ σ (x) to be the game formed by deleting all actions m ∈ M \σ(x) at each evidentiary history as well as the histories emanating from these deleted actions. So at any evidentiary history in Γ σ (x), σ(x) is the set of available speaker actions. For any natural number n, write Γ ∈ G n if each history in Γ has at most n evidentiary subhistories. (A subhistory of history h is an initial subsequence of h, possibly the empty sequence). So, if Γ belongs to G n , the speaker has at most n opportunities to present evidence at Γ. A mechanism is a pair (Γ, λ) where Γ is a game meeting the above specifications and λ is a behavioral strategy for the listener in Γ. λ induces a listener strategy in every game Γ σ (x) for x ∈ X.
In particular, every information set I in Γ σ (x) corresponds to some information set I in Γ at which the listener has observed the same sequence of events. 4 λ specifies that the listener will behave in I as he would in I . Our formulation encodes the assumption that the listener commits to his strategy. We assume that at each state x, the speaker selects a best reply to λ in Γ σ (x).
Proposition 1
The minimal error probability among all mechanisms (Γ, λ) with Γ ∈ G n is attained by the optimal dynamic persuasion rule for message correspondence σ n .
Proof. In Appendix.
Proposition 1 is closely related to Theorem 6 of Bull and Watson (2007) , which presents a canonical mechanism (the special three-stage mechanism) for dynamic (weak) implementation. Due to the special structure of the persuasion problem, the dynamic communication protocol has more structure than the special three-stage mechanism: the option to reject the speaker outright (at Step 3b) and the requirement to accept the speaker exactly if she presented the requested evidence are absent from the special three-stage mechanism (in
Step 5). Indeed "acceptance" and "rejection" have no meaning in the more general framework of Bull and Watson (2007) . Another difference is that whereas Bull and Watson's Theorem 6 applies to dynamic mechanisms where each terminal history contains exactly one evidentiary subhistory (per player), which is natural given their concerns, Proposition 1 shows how dynamic persuasion rules (weakly) improve upon arbitrary dynamic mechanisms allowing the speaker to present evidence up to a fixed number of times n. Our result shows that given any time constraint, we can restrict attention to the dynamic communication protocol, using message correspondence σ if one round of evidence transmission is allowed, and, more generally, simply reinterpreting the message correspondence as σ n if n rounds of evidence transmission are allowed.
3 Optimal Persuasion Rules
Programs for Optimal Rules
We now present optimization problems whose solutions are optimal static and dynamic persuasion rules. A feasible solution is of the form (µ, β) = ({µ z } z∈X , {β(x, m)} x∈A,m∈σ(x) ):
4 Note, however, that not every information set in Γ corresponds to an information set in Γσ(x).
Program P0
For each z ∈ X, µ z is the probability of error at state z. The objective is to minimize the total error probability. We may interpret β(x, m) as g(x, m), the probability that the dynamic persuasion rule requests the message m if the speaker claims that the state is
x. Whereas g(x, m) is defined for all x ∈ X, β(x, m) is only defined for states x ∈ A (and m ∈ σ(x)). Intuitively, the program restricts attention to dynamic rules which always reject the speaker if she claims that the state is in R. (6) can then be interpreted as saying that for any state x ∈ A, the error probability at x equals the probability that the rule would reject the speaker at state x if she truthfully reported the state. (7) says that for any state y ∈ R and any state x ∈ A, the error probability at state y is at least the acceptance probability that the speaker would obtain at state y if she claimed that the state were x. (7) implies that at each state y ∈ R, the speaker is optimizing. But P0 contains no constraints directly imposing optimizing behavior at states x ∈ A; the program assumes via (6) that for each x ∈ A, the speaker reports truthfully but there are no corresponding incentive constraints.
Theorem 1 Let (µ * , β * ) be an optimal solution to P0. Then g * defined by
is an optimal dynamic persuasion rule. g * induces error probability µ * z at state z.
The above program characterizes optimal dynamic persuasion rules. Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) showed that when restricting attention to static persuasion rules, there always exists an optimal static rule f * which is deterministic, meaning that f * (m) ∈ {0, 1} for all m (see their Proposition 1). Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) also argue informally-with respect to the special case of (1, 2)-verification problems to be defined in Section 3.2-that dynamic persuasion rules without randomization reduce to static persuasion rules. We now establish the latter reduction argument for a wider class of persuasion environments, and in the process, specify the precise relationship between optimal static and optimal dynamic rules. To do this, we consider two ways of adding integrality constraints to Program P0:
Program P1 Perform the minimization in (5) subject to (6-8) and
Program P2 Perform the minimization in (5) subject to (6-7), (9) and
Theorem 2 1. Let (µ * , β * ) be an optimal solution to P1. Then f * defined by:
is an optimal static persuasion rule. f * induces error probability µ * z at state z.
2. Any optimal solution to P1 is an optimal solution to P2. For any optimal solution (µ * , β * ) to P2, there exists β * * such that (µ * , β * * ) is an optimal solution to P1.
The theorem shows that adding integer constraints transforms P0 from a program for optimal dynamic persuasion to a program for optimal static persuasion. This can be done in two distinct ways: either by imposing a no-randomization constraint on the listener's requests (P1) or by imposing a no-randomization constraint on the state-by-state error probabilities (P2). 5 Thus we have a single formulation for both the static and dynamic persuasion problem, which differs only insofar as we restrict our search to integral solutions.
This highlights the role of randomization. In static persuasion, randomization is permitted but inessential, as there always exists an optimal static persuasion rule which is deterministic. There, the listener can only randomize the accept/reject decision in response to a message. In contrast, in the dynamic persuasion problem, the listener randomly requests evidence in response to a cheap talk claim about the state. Theorem 2 implies that the elimination of random requests reduces dynamic persuasion to static persuasion.
Theorem 2 implies that optimal dynamic rules have weakly lower error probability than optimal static rules because the static problem is derived from the dynamic problem by adding constraints. 6 Example 1 shows that this inequality may sometimes be strict.
5 Given an optimal solution to P2, the proof of Part 2 of Theorem 2 shows how to derive an optimal solution to P1, and hence how to derive an optimal static persuasion rule via (13).
6 This is also a consequence of Proposition 1.
Example 1 Let X := {0, 1} 3 , A := {x :
Message (1, 2) reveals that the second component of the state is 1, and (0, 3) reveals that the third component is 0. Let p z = 1 8 for all z ∈ X. An optimal static persuasion rule is:
f * leads the speaker to be accepted at every state except (1, 1, 1), inducing an error probability of 3 8 . In contrast, an optimal dynamic persuasion rule is:
g * leads the speaker to be accepted with probability 1 at every state in A, and to be accepted with probability 2 3 in every state in R, inducing an error probability of , the optimal dynamic persuasion rule g * outperforms the optimal static persuasion rule f * .
Insufficiency of the L-Principle
We compare our approach to that of Glazer and Rubinstein. An L is a pair (x, T ) with
is not an L. Glazer and Rubinstein introduced the L-principle:
To understand this, consider an L, (x, T ), and observe that if a deterministic static rule f avoids a mistake at x ∈ A, f must accept some message m ∈ σ(x). Then µ x = 0, so y∈T µ y ≥ 1. Why? Because at least one y ∈ T also has m. So f must accept the speaker at y, committing a mistake. Similar logic applies with randomization and even to dynamic rules. The following class of environments helps us to understand to scope of the L-principle:
(k,n)-Verification Environment Let k and n be natural numbers with 1 ≤ k < n. Let
. . , n be a collection of finite sets with |X i | ≥ 2 for all i, and let the set of states X have the structure X = X 1 × X 2 × · · · × X n . For any J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X, define x J := {(x j , j) : j ∈ J}, and let σ(x) := {x J : |J| ≤ k}. So, at each state, the speaker observes a vector (x 1 , . . . , x n ). The speaker can reveal (at most) k components of the vector. If the speaker reveals a component, she reveals both its value (x i ∈ X i ) and its index (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}). The speaker is restricted to reveal at most k components, but it is feasible for her to reveal any k components.
Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) studied static persuasion for general environments from Section 2.1, using program GR1 below. Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) studied dynamic persuasion, but only for (1,2)-verification environments, 7 using a special case of GR0: 8
Program GR0 Minimize z∈X p z µ z subject to the L-principle (15) and
Program GR1 Minimize z∈X p z µ z subject to the L-principle (15) and
Theorem 3 1. (Glazer and Rubinstein 2004) Let (µ * x ) x∈X be an optimal solution to GR0 for some (1, 2)-verification environment. Then there is an optimal dynamic persuasion rule g * such that for all states x ∈ X, g * induces error probability µ * x at x.
(Glazer and Rubinstein 2006)
Let (µ * x ) x∈X be a solution to GR1 for any persuasion problem. Then there is an optimal static persuasion rule f * such that for all states x ∈ X, f * leads to error probability µ * x at state x.
Unfortunately, it impossible to extend the first part of the result to general (k, n)-verification environments, and hence also to general persuasion environments.
Theorem 4 1. Any optimal solution to GR0 gives a lower bound on the error probability at the optimal dynamic persuasion rule.
2. Fix natural numbers n and k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) For all (k, n)-verification environments, the value of the corresponding program GR0 is equal to the error probability at the optimal dynamic persuasion rule.
Part 1 and its proof show that the L-principle is valid for general persuasion problems.
In other words, the error probabilities induced by any dynamic persuasion rule must satisfy 7 In Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) , rather than the speaker presenting evidence, the listener verifies an aspect of the speaker's claim, but for (1,2)-verification environments, the two are mathematically equivalent.
8 Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) discuss extending the L-principle to (1, n)-verification environments for n > 2 in a dynamic setting. They mention L's of the form (x, {y i , y j }) such that x differs from y i exactly on component i and from y j exactly on component j, where i = j, but neglect to mention other minimal L's in the sense of the more general definition they later presented in Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) , such as those of the form (x, {y i : i = 1, . . . , n}) where y i agrees with x only on component i. The neglected minimal L's are all valid in the sense that they must be satisfied by any dynamic persuasion rule. Omitting these L's only makes the problem identified by Theorem 4 below worse, because that theorem shows that the L-principle imposes too few constraints in a dynamic setting.
the L-principle (15). However, part 2 shows that the L-principle (15) is not sufficient to characterize optimal persuasion rules in a large class of dynamic persuasion environments.
This applies even within the restricted class of (k, n)-verification problems. The L-principle is only sufficient when n − k = 1. Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) showed that in the static persuasion problem, there is no value to commitment for the listener: In the game where the speaker moves first, sending a message m ∈ σ(x), and then the listener responds with an action, there is an equilibrium leading to the same outcome as the optimal rule. This is the credibility result. Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) presents a similar credibility result for dynamic persuasion rules for the special case of (1, 2)-verification environments described in the previous section. In this section, we extend the credibility result to general dynamic persuasion rules. Sher (2011) extended the static credibility result to non-binary decisions under a concavity assumption.
Credibility
In a dynamic persuasion problem, the game without commitment is a game which has the same timing as the dynamic communication protocol of Section 2.2. The difference is that the listener does not commit to a dynamic persuasion rule prior to the game, but rather decides which message to request (in Step 3a), whether to reject without requesting further evidence (in Step 3b), and whether to accept or reject conditional on the receipt of any message (in Step 5). In particular, in Step 5, the listener is not forced to accept the speaker's request if the speaker presents the message which the listener requested. Nor is the listener forced to reject the speaker's request if some other message is presented.
Define the speaker's reporting strategy to be the part of the speaker's (behavioral) strategy that specifies her cheap talk claim about the state. Let ζ(x,x) be the probability that the speaker claims that the state isx conditional on the actual state being x. To attain a complete description of the speaker's strategy, we must supplement the reporting strategy In order to analyze the credibility of the optimal persuasion rule, it is useful to analyze the dual of program P0:
For each x ∈ A and y ∈ R, there is a variable ϕ(x, y), which is the multiplier on the incentive constraint (7) corresponding to the pair (x, y), which says that at y, the speaker must achieve at least the acceptance probability that she would achieve if she were to claim that the state were x. In addition for each x ∈ A, there is a variable ϕ(s, x), which is the multiplier on the constraint (6), the constraint equating the error probability at x with the probability that the speaker is rejected at x given that she reports truthfully. The reason for the notation s in ϕ(s, x) will be explained in Section 5. For each y ∈ R, there is a variable ϕ(y, t), where again the notation t will be explained in Section 5. ϕ(y, t)
does not correspond to any constraint in Program P0, but is rather a variable defined by (22). The introduction of this variable simplifies the constraint (20). We will use the
Define a credible implementation of a dynamic persuasion rule g to be a sequential equilibrium of the game without commitment which induces error probability µ x (g) at each state x. In other words, the credible implementation leads to the same outcome as committing to g.
Theorem 5
Let (µ * , β * ) be an optimal solution to P0, let g * be the corresponding optimal dynamic persuasion rule defined by (10), and let ϕ * be an optimal solution to D. Then there exists a credible implementation of g * . The speaker's reporting strategy is:
, if x ∈ R and y ∈ A; 0, otherwise.
except at x ∈ R with ϕ * (x, t) = 0, where ζ * (x, y) can be chosen arbitrarily. On the equilibrium path, the speaker presents the evidence the listener requests whenever it is available.
On the equilibrium path, the listener's behavior coincides what it would have been if he had committed to g * as in Section 2.2.
Theorem 5 is a credibility result for dynamic persuasion rules. The theorem shows that optimal dynamic persuasion rules derived from program P0 are credible in the sense that they are consistent with equilibrium in the game without commitment. The credible implementation achieves the same error probability as the optimal rule in the game with commitment. The theorem also shows that there always exists an equilibrium supporting the optimal rule at which in A, the speaker tells the truth, while in R, the speaker randomizes over lies.
Theorem 5 extends the result of Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) -which only applied to
(1, 2)-verification environments-to the class of all persuasion environments. Theorem 5 also complements the credibility result for static persuasion rules in Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) . As in Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) , the proof involves optimality conditions for a pair of dual linear programs. In our case, these programs are Program P0, from which the optimal rule is derived, and its dual, Program D, from which the speaker's strategy is derived. In contrast, Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) employed Program GR0 and its dual.
However, Theorem 4 showed that Program GR0 is generally valid only for (k, n)-verification problems with n − k = 1.
Foresight and Max Flow
We present a condition-foresight-under which the optimal persuasion problem reduces to the classical maximum flow problem. One consequence is that the optimal static rule is optimal even among dynamic rules. We derive additional consequences, translating properties of max flow to properties of optimal persuasion. In addition to the consequences we derive (determinism, coincidence of static and dynamic optimality, nature of credible equilibrium strategies, symmetry, complexity), the reduction implies comparative statics which we explore elsewhere (Sher 2008) .
Foresight
We motivate foresight with an example:
Example 2 Let M = {1, . . . , n}. Interpret a message m ∈ M as evidence that would be persuasive if it is genuine and not fabricated. In states x ∈ A, all evidence is genuine as the speaker is unwilling or unable to fabricate. For x ∈ A, we allow σ(x) to be an arbitrary nonempty subset of M . In states y ∈ R, all evidence is fabricated. In general, no observable characteristic distinguishes genuine from fabricated evidence. Assume that if i < j, then evidence i is easier to fabricate than evidence j, which means that:
The example is clearly special, yet any persuasion environment may be interpreted along similar lines: Define evidence m to be (weakly) less forgeable than m if:
m is minimally forgeable at x ∈ A if m ∈ σ(x) and m is weakly less forgeable than any m ∈ σ(x). 9
Definition 1 A persuasion environment allows foresight if at each accept state x ∈ A, there exists a minimally forgeable message m x .
We use the term "foresight" because if there is a minimally forgeable message at accept state x, then the speaker should foresee that this is the evidence that the listener would require to support the claim that the state is x (see Corollaries 1 and 2 below). For this reason we also refer to m x as the obvious question at x. In contrast, when foresight fails, the listener may randomize, making evidence requests unpredictable.
Example 2 allows foresight, with minimally forgeable message m x = max{i : i ∈ σ(x)} at x ∈ A. Unlike the example, foresight does not generally require a global ranking of evidence in terms of forgeability; foresight is even consistent with the availability of two messages at accept state x neither of which is weakly more forgeable than the other. (k, n)-verification environments (Section 3.2) typically violate foresight (depending on the choice of A).
Foresight generalizes normality, a notion used by Bull and Watson (2007) , which is equivalent to the full reports condition of Lipman and Seppi (1995) , and resembles the nested range condition of Green and Laffont (1986) . 10 To compare normality to foresight, we generalize the forgeability relation. In particular, for any Y ⊆ X, define the relation Y on the set of messages by:
Say that m is Y -minimal at x if (i) m ∈ σ(x), and (ii) m Y m , for all m ∈ σ(x). So σ allows foresight if there is a R -minimal message at every state in A. In contrast, σ 9 The minimally forgeable message, when it exists, may not be unique. 10 Papers exploring similar notions include Deneckere and Severinov (2008) , Singh and Wittman (2001) , and Forges and Koessler (2005) . Models with normal message structures include Milgrom (1981) , Milgrom and Roberts (1986) , Shin (1994a) , Shin (1994b) , Shin (2003) , Bull and Watson (2004) , and Dziuda (2011) . Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012) and Kartik and Tercieux (2012) study full implementation with evidence and explore normality in that context. An older version of the latter discussed when dynamic mechanisms outperform static mechanisms for full Nash implementation with evidence as well as the bearing of normality on this issue.
is normal if there is a X -minimal message at every state in X. So foresight is weaker than normality in two ways. First, foresight employs the finer relation R , while normality employs the coarser relation X ; any X -minimal message is R -minimal, but not every R -minimal message is X -minimal, so that X -minimal messages may fail to exist in states with R -minimal messages. Hence, the requirement of the existence of X -minimal messages is more stringent. Second, foresight only requires R -minimal messages at accept states (that is, states in A), while normality requires X -minimal messages at all states in X.
The interpretation of the two notions is also different: If a message m is X -minimal at x, it is maximally informative in the sense that message m rules out (weakly) more states (in the sense of inclusion) than any other message at x. This concords with the common interpretation according to which normality holds in the absence of time constraints, where the maximal message corresponds to a presentation of all available evidence. In contrast, a message which is R -minimal cannot be said to be maximally informative in the above sense, as R -minimality of m at x implies nothing about the relative availability of m at states (other than x) in A. R -minimality of m at x means that x is maximally informative with respect to the specific question of what the state could be if the state belongs to R.
From another point of view, an X -minimal message is one that it is difficult to use in the sense that it is (relatively) infrequently available, whereas a R -minimal message is a message which it is difficult to abuse in the sense that it is difficult to use when the listener would not like to be persuaded. This justifies the terminology forge above.
For Y ⊆ X, consider the environment where the set of states is Y and the message correspondence is the restriction of σ to Y . If this environment is normal, then we say that the message correspondence σ is normal on Y. The following remark and its proof show how to construct many message correspondences which allow foresight but are not normal.
Remark 1 Any normal environment must be normal on Y , for all Y ⊆ X. In contrast, (i) any message correspondence which is not normal on A can be extended to a message correspondence on X that allows foresight, and (ii) any message correspondence which is not normal on R can be extended to a message correspondence on X that allows foresight.
For (i), let σ be arbitrary on A, and assume wlog that M = {1, . . . , n} and extend σ to R so that it satisfies (25). (ii) is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3 Let σ be arbitrary on R but assume that for all x ∈ A, σ(x) contains only a single message. 11 Such environments allow foresight. For interpretation, assume the listener would like to accept the speaker only if she is honest. The speaker is honest if she is an essentially non-strategic player-a behavioral type-whose only option is to present truthful 11 Strictly speaking, we assume that σ(x) contains only a single non-vacuous message (see Section 2.1).
evidence. In contrast, the listener would like to reject the speaker if she is strategic, and selects her evidence to maximize her benefit.
While foresight entails an obvious question at every accept state, it does not imply that the optimal rule is obvious. Optimality requires that we determine the level at which evidence is sufficiently difficult to fabricate: If the speaker's opening argument claims that the state is x ∈ A, is m x sufficiently difficult to forge for it to be worthwhile for the listener to ask the obvious question rather than rejecting the speaker outright? Section 5.2 determines whether m x meets this criterion by solving a max flow problem (see Corollary 2).
Max Flow
Under foresight, we reduce optimal persuasion to the classical maximum flow problem. 12 We begin by constructing a network corresponding to the persuasion problem. 13 A directed graph is a pair (V, E) where V is a set of vertices and E is a set of directed edges. Assume V = X ∪ {s, t}, where X is the set of states in the persuasion problem, and s and t are two new vertices. s is called the source and t is called the sink. The edge set is given by:
In addition, each edge (v, w) ∈ E has a capacity c(v, w), defined as follows:
(28) set of states X = {1, . . . , 8}, the second column shows whether each state belongs to A or R,
12 For an extensive treatment of the maximum flow problem, see Ahuja et al. (1993) . 13 This resembles the conversion of the maximal closure problem to max flow problem in Picard (1976) . Figure 1: A network corresponding to a persuasion environment.
the third column gives the probability of each state, and the last column gives the messages available at the state. One can verify that the the environment specified by Table 1 allows foresight. At each state x ∈ A = {1, 2, 4, 5}, the obvious question is m x . Figure 1 presents a network corresponding to this persuasion environment. States in A and R correspond to vertices in the left and right columns respectively. The graph also contains a source s and a sink t. An edge (in E 1 ) with capacity p x points from s to each x ∈ A; an edge (in E 3 ) with capacity p y points from each y ∈ R to t. For all x ∈ A and y ∈ R, if y can mimic x (i.e., σ(x) ⊆ σ(y)) there is an infinite capacity edge (in E 2 ) pointing from x to y. Infinite capacities are not labeled to avoid cluttering the diagram.
The maximum flow problem on the above defined network is:
The variable ϕ(v, w) may be conceived as a flow of some commodity along edge (v, w) . (30) are flow conservation constraints which say that the flow into any vertex (other than the source or sink) is equal to the flow out of that vertex. (31) are capacity constraints saying that the flow along any edge cannot exceed that edge's capacity. Max Flow attempts to ship as much flow out of the source as possible subject to these constraints. An optimal solution is a maximum flow. (29-32) is a special case of the maximum flow problem because the edge set has structure (27) and the capacity function takes the form (28). 14 The dual of the maximum flow problem is the minimum cut problem:
Min Cut
γ s = 1 (37) 2. Any optimal solution to Min Cut induces an optimal solution to Program P0 via:
Moreover, Max Flow, Min Cut, Program P0, and Program D all attain the same value.
Say that optimal dynamic and static persuasion rules coincide if optimal dynamic and static rules lead to the same error probability. It is well known that Min Cut always has an integer optimum solution, meaning one with γ x ∈ {0, 1} for all x ∈ V and δ(v, w) ∈ {0, 1} for all (v, w) ∈ E. 17 Combining Theorems 1 and 2 with Theorem 6 immediately yields:
14 Typically, the max flow objective is the difference between the outflow the inflow of the source; because here the edge set (27) does not contain edges entering the source, the objective is simply the outflow. 15 We could have replaced ∞ by any sufficiently large real number in (28). 16 Since Max Flow does not contain variables ϕ(x, y) when (x, y) ∈ (A × R) \ E, to interpret a Max Flow solution ϕ as a solution to Program P0, we extend ϕ to edges (x, y) ∈ (A × R) \ E by setting ϕ(x, y) = 0.
17 This is a consequence of the total unimodularity of the constraint matrix.
Corollary 1 Assume Foresight. Then there exists an optimal dynamic persuasion rule which is deterministic, and hence optimal dynamic and static rules coincide.
While foresight implies that the optimal dynamic rule can be implemented using a static rule, it does not imply that all dynamic rules can be implemented using static rules. Specifically, modifying Example 1 so that either A = ∅ or A = X, then, vacuously, the example allows foresight. Corollary 1 then implies there is a static rule which is optimal even among dynamic rules. Indeed, if A = ∅, this is the static rule that rejects all messages and if A = X, it is static rule that accepts all messages. Defining Z := {x :
3 i=1 x i is even}, the dynamic rule:
induces a vector of acceptance probabilities (α(g, x) : x ∈ X) that cannot be replicated by any static rule. Rule (40) is the same as (14) except that Z is no longer equal to A. Similarly, in Example 4, which allows foresight, consider the dynamic rule g with g(x, m) = These examples establish that Corollary 1 is fundamentally different from Theorem 5 of Bull and Watson (2007) which shows that under normality, dynamic and static (weak) implementation coincide in their general mechanism design framework with evidence. Whereas their result presents a sufficient condition for anything feasible via a dynamic mechanism to be feasible via a static mechanism, our result establishes a sufficient condition for something optimal via a dynamic mechanism to be feasible, and hence optimal, via a static mechanism. 18 We now interpret Min Cut. A cut is a set of vertices Z ⊆ V with s ∈ Z, t ∈ Z. Let C be the set of all cuts in our network. The capacity of a cut Z is:
So the capacity of a cut Z is the sum of capacities of all edges crossing the cut. The set of cuts corresponds to the set of integer solutions to Min Cut. In particular, γ x = 1 exactly if x ∈ Z and γ x = 0 otherwise; δ(v, w) = 1 if (v, w) crosses Z (i.e, v ∈ Z, w ∈ Z) and δ(v, w) = 0 otherwise. Min Cut can then be rewritten as: minimize c(Z) subject to Z ∈ C.
An optimal solution Z is a minimum cut. Any maximum flow ϕ induces a minimum cut Z; the induced minimum cut is the set of vertices reachable from the source in the residual graph induced by ϕ (for details, see Ahuja et al. (1993) ).
Corollary 2 Assume Foresight. A maximum flow induces both an optimal rule and its credible implementation. Specifically, any minimum cut Z corresponds to the optimal rule:
g accepts the speaker at states in Z \ s and rejects the speaker otherwise. A maximum flow corresponds to a speaker strategy via (24). 19
The optimal static rule corresponding to the dynamic rule (41) Theorem 6 has consequences for the structure of the set of optimal static persuasion rules, meaning the set of static persuasion rules which are optimal among static rules. The following example will help us to explain this.
Example 5 This example is due to Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) . Consider a (2, 5)-verification environment with X i = {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , 5. (See Section 3.2 for the definition of (k, n)-verification environments). Let A := {x ∈ {0, 1} 5 :
32 for all x. Interpret x i = 1 (resp., x i = 0) as a fact supporting (resp., opposing) the speaker's request. So, the listener prefers to accept exactly when a majority of facts support the speaker, but the speaker can only present two facts. The optimal static rule partitions the indices {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} into two sets of size 2 and 3, which we call categories-for example {1, 2} and {3, 4, 5}-and accepts the speaker only if the speaker presents two facts supporting her request in the same category. For example, if the evidence consists of the opinions of five experts, two of which are women and three of which are men, it would be optimal to require the speaker to present supporting opinions of two experts of the same gender to win acceptance. Categories such as gender are ex ante irrelevant but the optimal rule may have to make use of some such categories. The model of Fishman and Hagerty (1990) on optimal disclosure has a similar character.
19 See Theorem 5 and its proof for the exact details of this strategy. See also footnote 16. 20 Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) established a credibility result for static rules. Our result differs in two ways: (i) the optimal static rule is also an optimal dynamic rule so one can actually implement the optimal dynamic rule in the static communication protocol without commitment, and (ii) one can derive the credible implementation by solving a maximum flow problem. Neither (i) nor (ii) hold without Foresight. 21 We modify f to accept additional messages available only in A (if any exist) to ensure off-path rationality.
We now formalize the asymmetry of the optimal rule found in the above example.
Definition 2 A pair of bijections (π, ξ) with π : X → X and ξ : M → M is a symmetry if for all x:
Static rule f is symmetric if for every symmetry (π, ξ) and every m ∈ M , f (m) = f (ξ(m)).
Intuitively, a persuasion rule is symmetric if it treats any two pieces of evidence which cannot be distinguished without labels-or in other words, in terms of their intrinsic propertiesin the same way. One can show that every optimal static rule in Example 5 is asymmetric.
For this, it is critical that Example 5 violates foresight.
Theorem 6 allows us to identify a symmetric optimal static rule under foresight. Say a static rule f is less difficult than static rule f if f (m) ≤ f (m) for all m ∈ M . The less difficult a rule f , the easier for the speaker to persuade the the listener under f . A least difficult optimal static persuasion rule is a persuasion rule which is both optimal among static rules, and less difficult than all other optimal static rules. Theorem 6 implies:
Corollary 3 Assume Foresight. Then there exists a least difficult optimal static rule f * .
f * is symmetric.
This result follows from the well known lattice structure of the set of minimum cuts (Ford and Fulkerson 1956) . Under foresight, optimal deterministic static persuasion rules-or more precisely, the acceptance probabilities induced by such rules-correspond to minimum cuts, where rules higher up on the lattice tend to make persuasion easier. f * is the persuasion rule which accepts message m exactly if m is accepted by some optimal deterministic static rule. Clearly f * is symmetric, but as shown by Example 5, in general, f * need not be optimal. However, (α(f * , x) : x ∈ X) is the supremum of the acceptance probabilities of the set of optima, implying under foresight that since the set of optima is a lattice, that f * is itself optimal.
In contrast to static rules, there always (even without foresight) exists a symmetric optimal dynamic rule g * due to the convexity of the set of acceptance probability vectors induced by dynamic rules. However, unlike in the case of foresight where f * is deterministic, without foresight, there need not exist a deterministic symmetric optimal dynamic rule. In light of Example 5, this suggests that in the absence of foresight, some arbitrariness in categorization can be an (imperfect) substitute for randomized back-and-forth communication.
Also, g * need not be the least difficult optimal dynamic rule as no such rule may exist.
However, under foresight, f * is optimal even among dynamic rules, and at every state, the speaker (weakly) prefers f * to all dynamic rules. 22 22 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for emphasizing this point.
Complexity
Theorems 1 and 6 have consequences for the complexity of optimal persuasion: 23
Theorem 7 1. The static persuasion problem is NP-hard.
2. In contrast, for environments allowing foresight, there is a polynomial time algorithm that computes both an optimal static rule f and a credible implementation of f .
3. Even without foresight, there exists a polynomial time algorithm that computes both an optimal dynamic persuasion rule g and a credible implementation of g. The result that with either (i) dynamic communication or (ii) foresight, not only is finding the optimal rule g tractable, but so is finding an equilibrium supporting g, contrasts with the general result that finding a Nash equilibrium in an arbitrary game is hard (formally, PPAD-complete) (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou 2006, Chen and Deng 2006) , and that finding the optimal Nash equilibrium for a given player is NP-hard (Gilboa and Zemel 1989) . That the listener optimal equilibrium is derived via a pair of dual linear programs resembles the fact that in zero-sum games an equilibrium can be derived via a pair of dual linear programs, 25 and that the optimal correlated equilibrium in a normal form game for any given player can be derived via a linear program (Gilboa and Zemel 1989) . 26
Conclusion
This paper has provided a new formulation of the optimal persuasion problem (Theorems 1 and 2). We thereby characterized the precise relation between static and dynamic persuasion. The methodology of this paper is promising for various extensions of the persuasion 23 See for example Goldreich (2008) for definitions of the standard complexity notions employed here. 24 Both P0 and D are easy to construct given the primitives of the problem, and have a number of variables and constraints which is polynomial in the number of states and messages. The proof of Theorem 5 implies that the parts of the speaker strategy other than the reporting strategy are also easy to construct.
25 In zero-sum games, all equilibria yield the same payoffs to all players, so finding any equilibrium is equivalent to finding the best equilibrium for any given player. Sher (2010) explores the relation between persuasion games and zero-sum games in more depth.
26 For more results on the complexity of equilibria, see Conitzer and Sandholm (2008) .
scenario and also for a broader class of problems concerning mechanism design with evidence. 27 Sher and Vohra (2011) apply a similar methodology to the problem of optimal price discrimination on the basis of evidence, a problem that has strong ties to optimal auctions.
That paper shows that the optimal price discrimination problem reduces to a minimum convex cost flow problem. Analogously to the current paper, the reduction to a network flow problem in Sher and Vohra (2011) is used to derive a credibility result for the price discrimination environment. That paper also establishes a surprisingly close relationship between the price discrimination and persuasion problems.
The specific concept of foresight also promises to generalize to a broader class of mechanism design problems. While the definition of normality treats all states symmetrically (see Section 5.1), and so depends only on properties of the evidence, foresight treats evidence at accept and reject states differently. A notion treating states symmetrically-such as normality-must impose a more stringent condition on evidence to guarantee that optimal static and dynamic mechanisms coincide. But foresight appears to be very closely tailored to the persuasion environment. How might it be generalized for problems other than persuasion? The key to understanding why normality can be weakened to foresight in the persuasion environment is the observation that the only binding incentive constraints are those saying that speaker types in reject states should not want to mimic speaker types in accept states. This accounts for the role in foresight of forgery of evidence (i.e., use of evidence at a reject state which is available at an accept state), as opposed to, for example, the use of evidence available at one accept state at another accept state. Suppose that in a more general mechanism design problem with evidence, one can argue a priori, without knowing the precise structure of evidence, that at the optimal mechanism, all binding incentive constraints that involve mimicking any type t concern the mimicking of t by some type s in a subset S(t) of the set of types. 28 (In an auction setting, S(t) might be the set of types with higher values than t.) Then one could generalize foresight: 29 A message is t-forged whenever it is used by a type in S(t), and the environment satisfies foresight if every type t has a message which is maximally difficult to t-forge (among messages available to t). Such a generalized notion of foresight is a promising avenue of exploration for more general mechanism design problems with evidence.
27 For a general treatment of the linear programming approach to mechanism design, and in particular, the application of network flow problems to mechanism design, see Vohra (2011) .
28 A type here determines both the agent's evidence and any other relevant characteristics, such as, for example, the agent's value for an object in an auction.
29 For this generalization to be non-trivial, it must be the case that at least for some types t, S(t) is a proper subset of the set of types other than t.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
Fix mechanism (Γ, λ) with Γ ∈ G n , and a best reply to the mechanism for the speaker. For any x ∈ X and S ∈ σ n (x), let H(x, S) be the set of terminal histories h in Γ(x) such that (i) the speaker is accepted at h and (ii) S is the set of messages m such that the speaker presents m at some evidentiary subhistory of h. Set g(x, S) equal to the probability that at state x the history belongs to H(x, S) given that the speaker uses her best reply; this probability is calculated conditional on the state being x. It is a best reply to dynamic rule g for the speaker to report the state truthfully. If at some state x, the speaker had a strict incentive to lie to g and claim that the state was y, then she would have had a strict incentive to mimic y in (Γ, λ), contrary to the assumption that the speaker used a best reply to (Γ, λ).
Indeed, mimicking y in (Γ, λ) can only be more attractive than claiming the state is y in g because in g, if the speaker fails to present the requested evidence S ∈ σ n (y), she will be rejected, whereas in (Γ, λ), if the speaker fails to present the evidence that would have led to acceptance at y, it is possible that she will be accepted. Given that the speaker reports truthfully to g, it is immediate that g and (Γ, λ) lead to the same total error probability.
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider an arbitrary dynamic rule g. For every state x ∈ A, let h(x) be an optimal cheap talk report for the speaker against g at x. For all x ∈ A and m ∈ σ(x): Define β(x, m) := g(h(x), m) if m ∈ σ(h(x)), and β(x, m) := 0 otherwise. For z ∈ X, define µ z :=
Using the definition of h(x), It is now straightforward to verify that (β, µ) is feasible in P0. µ z := µ z (g) and the fact that g was arbitrary now imply that the value of P0 is a lower bound on the error probability of the optimal dynamic rule. So to complete the proof it is sufficient to show that the rule g * defined in (10), using an optimal solution (β * , µ * ) to P0, satisfies µ z (g * ) = µ * z for all z ∈ X. Optimality and (10) imply ∀y ∈ R, µ * y = max{ m∈σ(x)∩σ(y) β * (x, m) : x ∈ A} = µ y (g * ). Assume for contradiction that there exist x , x ∈ A with:
Using feasibility of (µ * , β * ), it now follows that ∀y ∈ R, m∈σ(x )∩σ(y)β (x , m) = m∈σ(x )∩σ(x )∩σ(y)β (x , m) ≤ m∈σ(x )∩σ(y) β * (x , m) ≤ µ * y = µ y . With this inequality, it is straightforward to verify feasibility of (μ,β) in P0. (42) im-plies thatμ x < µ * x , which in turn implies that (μ,β) attains a lower value than (µ * , β * ) in P0, a contradiction.
We have established that for all z ∈ X, µ z (g * ) = µ * z , completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proposition 1 of Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) says there exists an optimal solution to the static persuasion problem that is deterministic. So let f be an arbitrary deterministic
m). With these inequalities, it
is straightforward to verify that (µ, β) is feasible in P1. µ z := µ z (f ) and the fact that f was arbitrary now imply that the value of P0 is a lower bound on the value of the static persuasion problem.
Let (µ * , β * ) be optimal in P0. (6), (8) and (11) imply:
Define static rule f * by (13). For x ∈ A:
where the second to last equality follows from (11) and (43) and the last equality follows from the feasibility of (µ * , β * ). Similarly, for y ∈ R:
The above implies Part 1 of Theorem 2. Let (µ * , β * ) be optimal in P2. For each x ∈ A with µ * x = 0, (6) implies that there exists m(x) ∈ σ(x) with β * (x, m(x)) > 0. For x ∈ A define: β * * (x, m) := 1 if both µ * x = 0 and m = m(x); define β * * (x, m) := 0 otherwise. Let y ∈ R. If µ * y = 0, (7) and (9) imply that for all x ∈ A and m ∈ σ(x)∩σ(y), β * (x, m) = 0. So the definition of m(x) implies: ∀x ∈ A, µ * x = 1 ⇒ m(x) ∈ σ(y). So ∀x ∈ A, µ * y = 0 = m∈σ(x)∩σ(y) β * * (x, m). If µ * y = 1, then ∀x ∈ A, µ * y = 1 ≥ m∈σ(x)∩σ(y) β * * (x, m). Using these relations, it is straightforward to verify that (µ * , β * * ) is feasible in P1.
Any optimal solution (µ, β) to P1 must satisfy µ y = max{ m∈σ(x)∩σ(y) β(x, m) : x ∈ A}.
This together with the P1 constraints imply (12), and hence that (µ, β) is feasible in P2.
The above arguments imply that P1 and P2 have the same value, and moreover imply part 2 of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 4
Let (x, T ) be an L. Any feasible solution (µ, β) in P0 satisfies: 1 − µ x = m∈σ(x) β(x, m) ≤ y∈T m∈σ(x)∩σ(y) β(x, m) ≤ y∈T µ y , where the first inequality follows from the fact that because (x, T ) is an L, σ(x) ⊆ y∈T σ(y). So the P0 constraints imply the L-principle, and the result now follows from Theorem 1.
Proof that 2a ⇒ 2b
(0 is even). Let J := {J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} : |J| = k}. Then P0 simplifies to:
To understand this, note that if |J| < k but β(x, x J ) > 0, then for some J with |J | = k and J ⊃ J, we can redefine β(x, x J ) := β(x, x J ) + β(x, x J ) and β(x, x J ) := 0, maintaining feasibility as well as the objective function value.
Symmetry of the problem and convexity of the feasible region the existence of a symmetric optimal solution, i.e., an optimal solution (µ * , β * ) such that there exist numbers µ * A , µ * R , and β * with µ * x = µ * A , ∀x ∈ A, µ * y = µ * R , ∀y ∈ R, and β * (x, x J ) = β * , ∀x ∈ A, ∀J ∈ J . So P0 further simplifies to:
To understand this, note that the tightest lower bound on µ y for y ∈ R is obtained using x ∈ A differing from y on exactly one component in which case:
At optimality, (46) holds with equality, implying that
so the objective value as a function of µ A is:
which is minimized at µ A = 0. So the value of P0 is (n − k)/2n.
Choose T ⊆ R with |T | ≤ k and x ∈ A. For any y ∈ R, there exists i(y) ∈ {1, . . . , n}
So define µ z := 1/(k + 1) if z ∈ R and µ z := 0 if z ∈ A. (48) implies that µ = (µ z : z ∈ X) satisfies all L constraints and hence is feasible in GR0. Moreover, µ leads to an error probability of 1/[2(k + 1)], which is less than (n −k)/2n-the value of P0-whenever n −k > 1 (and 0 < k). 30 We have constructed a (k, n)-verification problem in which the value of GR0 is strictly less than the value of P0. Theorem completes the proof.
Proof that 2b ⇒ 2a
Consider a (k, n)-verification problem with n − k = 1. For any z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n ) ∈ X, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
is a minimal L, so that:
For all x ∈ A := A\A , there exists i(x) ∈ {1, . . . , n} with:
Let J(i) := {1, . . . , n} \ i, so that x J(i) is the message that shows the value and index of all components other than i at x. Define:
, if x ∈ A , m = x J(i) , and
otherwise.
Define: µ z := 1 − m∈σ(x) β (x, m), if z ∈ A; and µ z := µ z if z ∈ R. Let x ∈ A and y ∈ R.
There exists i * ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
Using the above, it is straightforward to verify that (µ , β ) is feasible in P0.
where the last inequality follows from (49). For y ∈ R, µ y = µ y . So z∈X p z µ z ≤ z∈X p z µ z . Since µ was an arbitrary feasible solution in GR0, it follows that the value of P0 is a lower bound on the value of GR0. However, Part 1 of the theorem now implies that the values of P0 and GR0 are indeed the same.
Proof of Theorem 5
First we specify speaker and listener strategies and argue that they constitute a Bayesain Nash equilibrium (i.e., they are mutual best replies) inducing the error probability of the optimal rule. Afterwards, we will explain how these strategies can be modified to from a sequential equilibrium.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium implements the optimal rule
The speaker uses the reporting strategy ζ * given by (24) (unless y ∈ R and ϕ * (y, t) = 0, in which case the reporting strategy selects an arbitrary probability distribution over reports in A 31 ). At Step 4, the speaker presents the message the speaker requested if it belongs to σ(x) ∩ σ(x) where x is the true state andx was the speaker's cheap talk claim, and presents m 0 otherwise. The listener's strategy coincides with the optimal rule g * given by (10). In particular, this means that at Step 5, the listener accepts the speaker exactly if the speaker presented the message that the listener requested (even though the rules of the game do not require the listener to do this). Call any listener strategy that follows this rule for behavior at Step 5 and also only requests messages m ∈ σ(x) with positive probability following cheap talk reportx straightforward. Call the speaker's proposed equilibrium strategyζ * and the listener's strategyḡ * .ḡ * is straightforward.
31 Nothing of substance would change if we allowed the speaker to also select reports in R in this case.
Clearly, given the listener's strategy, the speaker would never have an incentive to modify her behavior at Step 4, 32 so we hold this behavior fixed throughout and consider only deviations from the speaker's reporting strategy.
Consider an arbitrary listener strategyh. Let h(x, m) be the probability that the listener requests message m conditional on cheap talk reportx. (The listener rejects without requesting evidence with probability 1 − m∈M h(x, m)). Let h • (x, m, m ) be the probability that the listener accepts the speaker conditional on the event that the speaker claims that the state isx, the listener requests message m, and then the speaker presents message m .
h may not be straightforward. Letḡ be an alternative straightforward listener strategy in which, conditional on cheap talk reportx, the listener requests message m with probability:
Thenḡ performs at least as well ash againstζ * . 33 So in considering listener deviations from g * , we can restrict attention to straightforward strategies, and hence consider deviations only from the listener's strategy for requesting evidence at Step 3.
The proof of Theorem 1 established that for any optimal solution (µ * , β * ) to P0, and
, implying that it is a best reply for the speaker to report truthfully at states x ∈ A. 34
Let y ∈ R. Assume for contradiction there exist x, x ∈ A with ζ * (y, x) > 0 but
Then by (7), µ * y > 0. Then complementary slackness implies: ϕ * (y, t) = p y > 0. So at y, ζ * is given by (24), implying: ϕ * (x, y) > 0. Complementary slackness now implies: µ * y = m∈σ(x)∩σ(y) g * (x, m), implying that µ * y < m∈σ(x )∩σ(y) g * (x , m), and contradicting (7). Soζ * is a best reply toḡ * . For x ∈ A and m ∈ σ(x), define p x := p x + y∈R ζ * (y, x)p y and define δ x,m := y∈R:m∈σ(y) ζ * (y, x)p y . p x is the probability that the speaker will claim that the state is x according to ζ * . δ x,m is the probability that (i) the state is in R, (ii) the speaker claims that the state is x, and (iii) the speaker has message m.
The listener's problem of choosing a straightforward best reply to ζ * can be represented
. 33 Assume the speaker usesζ * . If x ∈ A, then regardless of whether the listener usesh or g, the acceptance probability conditional on the state being x is:
If the listener usesh, the acceptance probability conditional on the state being y is:
If the listener usesḡ, the acceptance probability conditional on the state being y is:
When y ∈ R, the acceptance probability is (weakly)
smaller underḡ than underh. 34 A claim that the state belongs to R leads to certain rejection.
as that of choosing (g(x, m) : x ∈ A, m ∈ σ(x)) to minimize
subject to m∈σ(x) g(x, m) ≤ 1, ∀x ∈ A and g(x, m) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ A, ∀m ∈ σ(x). The optimality conditions for the above optimization problem are:
To establish thatḡ * is a best reply toζ * , it is sufficient to establish that g * satisfies (50-52).
(20-23) and (24) imply that for all x ∈ A and m ∈ σ(x):
Consider any x ∈ A such that m ∈σ(x) g * (x, m ) < 1. Then (6) and (10) imply: µ * x = 1 − m ∈σ(x) β * (x, m ) > 0. So complementary slackness implies: p x = ϕ * (s, x). (53) then implies that p x ≤ y∈R:m∈σ(y) ζ * (y, x)p y for all m ∈ σ(x). So g * satisfies (50).
Consider x ∈ A and m ∈ σ(x) with g * (x, m) > 0. We argue that in this case, all three inequalities in (53) become equalities. (10) implies that β * (x, m) > 0. So complementary slackness implies that the first inequality becomes an equality. For any y ∈ R with m ∈ σ(y), (7) implies: µ * y > 0. So complementary slackness implies: ϕ * (y, t) = p y , implying that the second inequality becomes an equality. Choose any y ∈ R with ϕ * (y, t) = 0. Because p y > 0, ϕ * (y, t) < p y . Complementary slackness implies that µ * y = 0, which implies via (7) that because β * (x, m) > 0, m ∈ σ(y). So the third inequality becomes an equality.
To summarize: ∀x ∈ A, ∀m ∈ σ(x), g * (x, m) > 0 ⇒ ϕ * (s, x) = y∈R:m∈σ(y) ζ * (y, x)p y . (19) now implies that g * satisfies (51). For all x ∈ A and m ∈ σ(x), (53) says that ϕ * (s, x) ≤ y∈R:m ∈σ(y) ζ * (y, x)p y , implying that g * satisfies (52). Soḡ * is a best reply tō ζ * . The fact thatζ * is a best reply toḡ * implies that the equilibrium (ζ * ,ḡ * ) induces the same error probability as the optimal rule g * at every state.
Strengthening the Bayesian Nash equilibrium to a sequential equilibrium
Finally we modifyζ * andḡ * so that the above Bayesian Nash equilibrium becomes a sequential equilibrium. Define M A := {m ∈ M : ∀x ∈ X, m ∈ σ(x) ⇒ x ∈ A}, A * := {x ∈ A : σ(x) ∩ M A = ∅}. For each x ∈ A * , choose m * (x) ∈ σ(x) ∩ M A . The speaker strategȳ ζ * * agrees withζ * with two exceptions: (i) Suppose x ∈ X \ A * andx ∈ X, m ∈ M satisfy:
x ∈X p x ζ * (x ,x)g * (x, m) = 0. Then if the state is x, the speaker presented the cheap talk reportx, and the listener requested m, the speaker will present m 0 . (ii) Suppose x ∈ A * , andx ∈ X, m ∈ M satisfy p x ζ * (x,x)g * (x, m) = 0. Then if the state is x, the speaker presented cheap talk reportx, and the listener requested m, the speaker will present m(x).
The listener strategyḡ * * agrees withḡ * with two exceptions: (ḡ * * ,ζ * * ) and (ḡ * ,ζ * ) only differ on zero probability histories, so (ḡ * * ,ζ * * ) induces the same error probability as the optimal rule g * at every state. We now verify thatḡ * * and ζ * * are mutual best replies. Because (ḡ * * ,ζ * * ) and (ḡ * ,ζ * ) only differ on zero probability histories, and (g * , ζ * ) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, to show thatḡ * * is a best reply toζ * * , it is sufficient to show that conditional on any reportx ∈ A, the listener has no incentive to request any message m with g * (x, m) = 0. Ifx ∈ A * , then the facts that (ḡ * * ,ζ * * ) implements an optimal rule andζ * * entails truthful reports on A imply that the listener is already achieving an error probability of zero conditional on reportx, and so has no incentive to deviate. Ifx ∈ A \ A * , then requesting a message m with g * (x, m) = 0 against ζ * * would lead to the same outcome as either rejecting the speaker without requesting any messages againstζ * , or requesting m 0 and then continuing according toḡ * againstζ * .
Since these deviations were not attractive in the equilibrium (ḡ * ,ζ * ), they cannot benefit the listener given the strategy profile (ḡ * * ,ζ * * ). Soḡ * * is a best reply toζ * * . The speaker can only causeḡ * andḡ * * to differ by presenting m ∈ M A , which is only possible in A * .
As explained above, in A * ,ḡ * * avoids error, and thus already accepts the speaker with probability 1 if the speaker usesζ * * . It follows thatζ * * is a best reply toḡ * * .
We now argue that in (ḡ * * ,ζ * * ), the speaker's strategy is sequentially rational off the equilibrium path. If x ∈ A * , this follows from the fact that conditional on any nonterminal history where speaker moves, the probability of acceptance is 1. If x ∈ X \ A * , then at all nonterminal off-equilibrium path histories where the speaker moves, the speaker has previously made a cheap talk claimx and the listener has requested a message m. Following such histories, according toζ * * , either every available message will lead to rejection or the speaker will present the only available message-either m or m 0 , depending on the historywhich will lead to acceptance. This establishes sequential rationality for the speaker.
We can representζ * * as a pair (ζ * , ζ • ) where ζ * is the speaker's reporting strategy, and ζ • (x,x, m, m ) is the probability that the speaker presents m if the true state is x, the speaker claimed that the state isx, and the listener requested message m . For each sufficiently small > 0, define a (totally mixed) speaker strategyζ := (ζ , ζ • ) by: ζ (x,x) := ζ * (x,x) − λ x , (λ x defined below) if ζ * (x,x) > 0; ζ (x,x) := if ζ * (x,x) = 0 and x ∈ R;
, and
, and x ∈ A. λ x and τ x,x,m are chosen so that x∈X ζ (x,x) = 1 and m ∈σ(x) ζ • (x,x, m, m ) = 1.ζ • →ζ * * as → 0. Let b be the limiting listener beliefs about the state (as a function of the listener's information set) induced byζ • as → 0 and any totally mixed listener strategy. 35 There are two kinds of off equilibrium listener information sets: (i) those where the listener knows that the speaker took some action which occurs with zero probability according toζ * * given the listener's past actions, and (ii) the off-equilibrium information sets not in the first category. In case (i), unless the speaker has presented a message m ∈ M A , according to b, the listener assigns probability 1 to the state being in R. Following such histories, the listener will always reject the speaker according toḡ * * , a best reply to his beliefs. In histories of type (i) where the speaker presents m ∈ M A , the listener will assign probability 1 to the state belonging to A according to b, and will accept the speaker, a best reply. Finally following histories of type (ii),ḡ * * is constructed so that the listener will reject the speaker exactly if according to b, he assigns probability of at most 1/2 to the state belonging to A, again, a best reply. This establishes thatḡ * is sequentially rational against beliefs b, completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 6 ϕ(x, y), ∀x ∈ A
Assume Foresight. Definition 1 and (23) imply: m x ∈ arg min m∈σ(x) y∈R:m∈σ(y) ϕ(x, y), ∀x ∈ A. Definition 1 implies: m x ∈ σ(x) ∩ σ(y) ⇔ σ(x) ⊆ σ(y), ∀x ∈ A, ∀y ∈ R. So (54)
35 b is independent of the listener's totally mixed strategy.
for any y ∈ R, δ(y, t) ≥ γ y − γ t = γ y , and if the inequality is strict, we can reduce δ(y, t),
implying (iii).
Fix an optimum (δ, γ) in Min Cut. Define (µ, β) by (39). We argue that (µ, β) is feasible in Program P. (39) implies: ∀x ∈ A, 1−µ x = 1−(1−γ x ) = γ x = m∈σ(x) β(x, m). (34), (39) and (ii) of Lemma 2 imply: ∀x ∈ A, ∀y ∈ R, σ(x) ⊆ σ(y) ⇒ µ y = γ y ≥ γ x − δ(x, y) = γ x = m∈σ(x)∩σ(y) β(x, m). (36), (39), and Foresight imply: ∀x ∈ A, ∀y ∈ R, σ(x) ⊆ σ(y) ⇒ µ y ≥ 0 = m∈σ(x)∩σ(y) β(x, m). Given the above relations, it is straightforward to verify that (µ, β) is feasible in Program P. (39), Lemma 2, (28), and Max Flow-Min Cut duality imply: z∈X p z µ z = x∈A p x (1 − γ x ) + y∈R p y γ y = (v,w)∈E δ(v, w)c(v, w) = x∈A ϕ(s, x), for any optimum ϕ of Max Flow. Part 1 of Theorem 6 and duality of programs P and D now imply optimality of (µ, β).
Solution to Example 4
(v, w) ϕ * (v, w) The maximum flow ϕ * for Example 4 is given by Table 2 . The table is split into three panels. The left, center, and right panel describe the flow ϕ * on edges in E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 , respectively (see (27) ). In each panel, an entry in the left column names an edge (v, w), the corresponding entry in the center column gives the flow ϕ * (v, w), and the entry in the right column gives the capacity c(v, w). an edge e consists of two parallel lines, this means that the flow along the edge is less than the capacity (i.e., ϕ * (e) < c(e)), whereas if it consists of only one line, this means that the flow is equal to the capacity. The residual capacity of edge e is c(e) − ϕ * (e). The residual capacity of edges connecting the source to A represents the net benefit of acceptance, or more precisely, the probability of accepting the speaker minus the probability of incorrectly A minimum cut Z * is {s, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8}. This is depicted in the figure as the set of vertices underneath the curve. The capacity of this cut is the sum of capacities of edges that cross from Z * to its complement; in the figure, this is the sum of capacities of edges that cross the curve from below, moving in a northeast direction. So the capacity of the minimum cut Z * is 6/16, which is the same as the value of the maximum flow (i.e., the quantity of flow exiting the source s). Z * consists of the set of vertices reachable from the source on a path that travels forward along edges with positive residual capacity or backwards along edges with positive flow. Corollary 2 implies that there is an optimal persuasion rule that accepts exactly messages {m 1 , m 4 , m 5 } and thereby accepts the speaker exactly in the states under the curve {1, 4, 5, 7, 8}. Corollary 2 also shows how to derive the speaker strategy in the credible implementation. At states x ∈ A, the speaker reports truthfully. At states y ∈ R, the speaker strategy is derived via the maximum flow. For example, at state 8 ∈ R, the speaker claims that the state is 1 and 5 with probabilities proportional to the flows on edges
(1, 8) and (5, 8): At 8, the speaker claims the state is 1 with probability with probability ϕ * (1, 8)/ϕ * (8, t) = 1/3 and that the state is 5 with probability ϕ * (5, 8)/ϕ * (8, t) = 2/3.
Finally, Theorem 6 tells us that the total error probability at the optimal rule is equal to 6/16, the value of the maximum flow.
Proof of Corollary 3
Let Z * be the union of all minimum cuts. (See the definition of a minimum cut in the paragraph preceding Corollary 2). Due to the lattice structure of the set of minimum cuts, Z * is itself a minimum cut. (Ford and Fulkerson 1956, Topkis 1998) . Define f * (m) := 1 if {x ∈ X : m ∈ σ(x)} ⊆ Z * , and f * (m) := 0 otherwise. f * accepts the speaker precisely at states in Z * . Theorem 6 and Corollary 1 imply that f * is an optimal persuasion rule. By construction, f * is less difficult than any other optimal deterministic static rule and f * is symmetric. Assume for contradiction that there is an optimal static rule f and message m such that f * (m ) = 0 < f (m ). Define (δ , γ ) so that γ x := α(f , x) and δ satisfies conditions (i-iii) in Lemma 2. Theorem 6 and optimality of persuasion rule f , imply that (δ , γ ) is an optimal solution to Min Cut. Because the constraint matrix of Min Cut is totally unimodular, the set of optimal solutions to Min Cut is a polytope with integral extreme points, and (δ , γ ) must be a convex combination of these integral extreme points.
For each such integral optimum (δ , γ ), there exists a corresponding optimal rule defined by f (m) := 1 if {x ∈ X : m ∈ σ(x)} ⊆ {x ∈ X : γ x = 1} and f (m) := 0 otherwise. At least one of these deterministic optimal rules must be such that f (m ) = 1, contradicting the fact that f * is the less difficult than all deterministic optimal rules. It follows that f * is less difficult than all static optimal rules.
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 7
Let U be a set and S a family of subsets of U such that S = U . The set cover problem is the problem of finding a minimal cardinality subset T of S such that T = U . This problem is known to be NP-hard. We will prove that the static persuasion problem (without foresight) is NP-hard by reduction from the set cover problem. Consider an instance of the set cover problem (U, S). For each S ∈ S construct a state x S , and let X = U ∪{x S : S ∈ S}.
Let A = U and R = {x S : S ∈ S}. For each x ∈ A, let p x := 2|R|/[(2|A| + 1)|R|] and for each y ∈ R, let p y := 1/[(2|A| + 1)|R|] For each S ∈ S, let there be a message m S , and define σ so that m S ∈ σ(x) ⇔ x ∈ S ∪ {x S }. We know that there is an optimal static persuasion rule which is deterministic, and any deterministic optimal static persuasion rule can be associated with the set K of messages that it accepts. Given the specification of the above persuasion problem, it is clear that any deterministic optimal persuasion rule must accept all states in A = U , or more precisely, must accept some message available at x for all x ∈ A. The goal is then to do this while accepting the minimum number of states in R, which amounts to finding a minimal cardinality collection K ⊆ M such that for all x ∈ A, K ∩ σ(x) = ∅. This is equivalent to finding a minimal cardinality subset T of S that covers U (i.e., T = U ), which is the set cover problem.
